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TITLE IX AND THE
SCHOLARSHIP DILEMMA
B. GLENN GEORGE*
After more than twenty-five years of enforcement (or lack thereof),
Title IX' has finally evolved into a second phase of interpretation.
Although Title IX has had a dramatic impact on the opportunities for
women in intercollegiate athletics, particularly in the last decade, most of
the attention until recently was focused on participation numbers. That
battle has largely been won, at least in the courts, if not on the field.
More recent attention has now turned to a new issue-the equitable al-
location of scholarship dollars. This second wave of Title IX enforce-
ment is well on its way and has already altered the manner in which
many institutions are counting and directing their scholarship budgets.
The challenge for the 21st century will be to look ahead to the third wave
of enforcement-one that reaches a new level of sophistication and ma-
turity in the way in which we discuss and address Title X's promise of
gender equity.
This paper begins with a brief history of Title IX's enactment and
early efforts of interpretation and application. I wiil then discuss the de-
velopment of a new focus on scholarship dollars and the difficulties in-
herent in the way that issue is being addressed. This problem creates a
potentially significant conflict between a university's obligations under
Title IX not to discriminate and strict scholarship quotas imposed by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).2 Finally, this paper
concludes with some questions and issues raised by both waves of Title
IX enforcement that have implications for the future direction of Title
IX and gender equity in intercollegiate athletics.
* Professor of Law and Associate Vice President for Human Relations and Risk Manage-
ment, University of Colorado.
1. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
2. The NCAA is the national association of colleges and universities that establishes and
enforces recruitment, participation, and competition rules for its members' intercollegiate ath-
letic programs.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TITLE IX
Others have written extensive and comprehensive histories of Title
IX which need not be repeated here.3 However, some background is
appropriate to put the current status of Title IX enforcement in context.
Although over twenty-five years old, Title IX has only developed as a
driving force in intercollegiate athletics during the last decade. Title IX's
prohibition, included in the Education Amendments of 1972,4 states in
straight-forward terms that no one "shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance."5 Some schools responded immediately, and
there were significant early gains in the participation rates of women in
intercollegiate athletic programs. Prior to Title IX, women accounted
for only fifteen percent of intercollegiate student athletes; the participa-
tion rate for women doubled by 1984.6
The application of this prohibition to intercollegiate athletics, how-
ever, was not secured until 1988. Some early interpretations of the legis-
lation had limited its application to the particular university programs
actually receiving federal dollars.7 In 1984, the Supreme Court took the
same position in the case of Grove City College v. Bell.8 Congress acted
four years later to overturn the result in Grove City College. The Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988 Amendments) 9 amended Title IX
to extend its prohibition against sex discrimination to the entire institu-
tion as long as a single program within the institution received federal
funds. Thus, Title IX did not come into its own as a force in the world of
intercollegiate athletics until little more than a decade ago.
In spite of Title IX's questionable application to intercollegiate ath-
letics in its early days, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare moved ahead under statutory mandate to issue
3. See e.g., Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX,
9 U. MIAMI Er. & SPORTS L. REv. 1 (1992); B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays:
Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 Wis. L. Rnv. 647.
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88.
5. Id. at § 1681(a).
6. See Heckman, supra note 3, at 33.
7. See e.g., Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th
Cir. 1982), vacated, 466 U.S. 901 (1984); O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
8. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
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regulations governing college sports programs.10 Those regulations were
issued in 1975 and, interestingly enough, included a section on the allo-
cation of financial aid:
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarship or
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such
award for members of each sex in proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegi-
ate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of
each sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for
members of each sex to the extent consistent with this paragraph
and § 106.41.11
Another section of the 1975 regulations defined the concept of
"equal opportunity" in college sports programs by listing ten factors for
consideration.' 2 Four years later, the Secretary provided further enlight-
enment in the 1979 Policy Interpretation which focused exclusively on
the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics.13 In 1980, enforce-
ment authority was transferred to the newly created Department of Edu-
cation and its Office for Civil Rights (OCR).' 4
A. The First Wave: Proportionality in Participation Rates
Soon after the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics was
secured in 1988, frustrated women athletes and their advocates turned to
the judicial system for relief. A wave of litigation in the early 1990s fo-
cused primarily on the issue of participation rates, disputes which were
often prompted by the institution's decisions to eliminate both men's
and women's teams as part of general budget cuts.15 The question of
participation opportunities understandably took precedent-issues like
10. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974).
The Javits Amendment, adopted by Congress in 1974, required the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to issue regulations under Title IX concerning intercollegiate athletic
activities.
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1997).
12. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
13. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
& Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter "Policy
Interpretation"].
14. The regulations were recodified at that time, see 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802, 30,962-63 (May
9, 1980) (establishing Title 34 of the C.F.R.).
15. See e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ.of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs successfully
challenged elimination of women's field hockey and gymnastics teams); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), afj'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs successfully
challenged the elimination of women's volleyball and gymnastics teams); Roberts v. Colorado
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financial aid, equipment budgets, and practice facilities were irrelevant
unless women's teams existed to enjoy those benefits.
OCR's definition of equity in participation rates, generally adopted
by the courts, made most of these cases clear winners for the com-
plaining women athletes. OCR's Policy Interpretation offered three ave-
nues for demonstrating compliance in this area, yet only one option was
available as a practical matter. In the 1975 regulations, the first factor in
the consideration of equal opportunity was "[w]hether the selection of
sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of members of both sexes."16 The 1979 Policy Interpreta-
tion elaborated on that requirement by establishing three possible
measures:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institu-
tion can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing in-
terest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continu-
ing practice of program expansion such as that cited above,
whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommo-
dated by the present program.17
As a practical matter, the first option under the Policy Interpreta-
tion-the proportionality standard-became the only relevant issue.' 8
The expansion of women's teams in the 1970s was followed by the elimi-
nation of both men's and women's teams in the 1990s as budgets tight-
ened.'9 Thus, few schools could point to any recent history of expanding
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) (plaintiffs
successfully challenged elimination of women's softball team at Colorado State University).
16. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1997).
17. Policy Interpretation, supra note 13, at 71,413.
18. See generally George, supra note 3, at 653.
19. The experience of Brown University (described more fully below in the litigation of
Cohen, 809 F. Supp. 978) is a good example. The expansion of the women's program and the
addition of new women's teams at Brown all occurred between 1971 and 1977 (with one ex-
ception). The program then remained stable until Brown decided, in 1991, to downsize both
the men's and the women's programs by cutting two teams for each. Id. at 981. Consequently,
when sued in 1992, Brown was unable to successfully point to a recent "continuing practice of
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opportunities for women, as required by the second option. The very
uncertainty of defining and measuring what it means to "effectively ac-
commodate the interests of both sexes" in option three apparently
caused most courts to avoid that standard altogether. By default, the
only safe harbor became the proportionality standard. Consequently,
school after school lost on (or chose not to dispute) the simple calcula-
tion of comparing the percentage of women in the student body to the
percentage of women in the intercollegiate athletic program.2"
Cohen v. Brown University,2' perhaps one of the best known Title IX
cases, is a good example. In 1991, Brown University decided to elimi-
nate women's volleyball and gymnastics, as well as men's golf and water
polo, in a belt-tightening move. The women sued and obtained a prelim-
inary injunction to restore the women's teams. The plaintiff's proof was
simple-both before and after the cuts, the number of female intercolle-
giate athletes at Brown University continued to lag behind the percent-
age of women in the general student body. After two appeals to the
First Circuit22 and a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,' Brown
University finally threw in the towel.24 Brown University's failure to
convince the Supreme Court to reexamine the mechanical approach of
the proportionality standard was understood by most as the loss of both
the battle and the war.
Given the almost universal success of the proportionality standard,
most institutions had a clear understanding of their participation obliga-
tions under Title IX and began moving toward compliance.' With par-
program expansion." Cohen, 991 F.2d 888, 903. See also Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814
F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) (noting
that no new women's teams had been added since the 1970s).
20. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, 1994 DET. C.L. RPv. 953,
966-94.
21. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992).
22. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) and 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
23. 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
24. See Jim Naughton, Judge Approves Plan to Settle Lingering Claims in Title IX Suit
Against Brown U., CHRON. DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1998 <http://chronicle.com/daily/98/06/
9806240Sn.shtml>. The settlement included an agreement to maintain the percentage of wo-
men athletes within 2.25 points of the percentage of women undergraduate students, the ele-
vation of water polo to varsity status, and guaranteed funds for three or four years for
women's fencing, skiing, and gymnastics. See id.
25. See Jim Naughton, Tension Between Title IX and NCAA Rules is at Heart of Lawsuit,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1997, at A39. The May 1997 report of the NCAA Gender
Equity committee found that the women constituted an average of 53% of the student body in
Division I schools. See id. The percentage of women athletes in Division I, however, was only
1999] TITLE IX
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ticipation opportunities secured, some began to look ahead to other
areas of concern. The allocation of scholarships jumped to the forefront.
B. The Second Wave: The Scholarship Dilemma
Now that women athletes were playing, were they getting their fair
share of scholarship dollars and financial aid? This issue was first ad-
dressed by regulations under Title IX in 1975, but has not been a signifi-
cant focus of compliance or litigation. That was changed by the National
Women's Law Center in June, 1997. In order to bring attention to the
issue, the Center filed a complaint with the OCR against twenty-five in-
stitutions alleging Title IX violations based on a smaller proportion of
financial aid going to women athletes.26 Targeted schools included both
large Division I programs, such at the University of Texas at El Paso and
the University of Colorado at Boulder, and lesser known athletic pro-
grams, such as Bethune-Cookman, Coppin State, and Wofford College.27
On the surface, the scholarship issue seems as straight-forward as the
principle of proportionate participation. If you accept proportional par-
ticipation, it seems a small step to suggest that the allocation of financial
aid should also be proportional. Were colleges and universities free to
assign those scholarship dollars within their discretion, the logic would
be hard to refute. That allocation is significantly constrained, however,
by NCAA rules, thus adding a new level of complexity to the problem.
To understand the difficulty, it is critical to understand the NCAA
scholarship rules. First, the NCAA mandates a maximum number of
scholarships permitted for each team, both men's and women's. In addi-
tion, some of these mandates are categorized as "head count" sports,
while others are "equivalency" sports. In a head count sport, all athletes
who receive a scholarship must be awarded a full scholarship. In
37%. See Jim Naughton, NCAA Survey Says More Women Play Sports But Get Less Support,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 9, 1997, at A46.
26. See Jim Naughton, Advocacy Group Charges 25 Colleges With Violating Title IX,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 1997, at A39.
27. See id. Perhaps responding to the concerns highlighted by the National Women's Law
Center in July 1998, OCR issued a "clarification" of its measures for compliance in this area.
In its 1990 compliance manual, OCR had permitted the use of a statistical calculation that
permitted a disparity as high as 3% to 5% based on "chance." The agency "clarification" has
now limited that flexibility and requires that the disparity be no greater than 1%. See Jim
Naughton, Clarification of Title IX May Leave Many Colleges in Violation Over Aid to Ath-
letes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 31, 1998, at A34; Karla Haworth, Statement on Sports
Scholarships Frustrates and Conftses Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Sept. 4, 1998, at A71
(including the full text of the July 23, 1998, letter from OCR's National Coordinator for Title
IX Athletics explaining OCR's revised position).
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equivalency sports, partial scholarships are permitted, so that a single
"full scholarship" can be divided among two or more student athletes.2
Head count sports for women include basketball (fifteen scholar-
ships), gymnastics (twelve scholarships), volleyball (twelve scholarships),
and tennis (eight scholarships), totaling forty-seven scholarships for all
four sports.2 9 Head count sports for men include only football (eighty-
five scholarships) and basketball (thirteen scholarships), but those two
sports alone account for ninety-eight available scholarships.3" Scholar-
ship limits in equivalency sports are generally set at relatively low levels.
Soccer and field hockey, for example, permit twelve scholarships each.31
As a final element of the problem, the NCAA requires that in order to
maintain its status as a Division I school, the school must compete in a
minimum of six men's sports.
With the numbers laid out, the mathematical problem is apparent:
How many women's teams must be created to offset the eighty-five
scholarships permitted in football? A hypothetical Division I institution
will serve to illustrate the problem.32 Assume the university offers the
mandatory number of six men's programs, football, basketball, track,
skiing, tennis, and golf. Eight women's sports are offered-basketball,
gymnastics, volleyball, soccer, track, skiing, tennis, and golf. The institu-
tion's undergraduate student body is between 45-47% female. By offer-
ing two more women's sports than men's, the percentage of female
athletes is 45%, thus achieving proportionate participation. If the school
awards every scholarship dollar permitted by the NCAA in these sports,
however, women will only be receiving 37% of the total financial aid
available-well below their "proportional" share.
The problem, of course, is generally limited to large Division I pro-
grams that include football. Without the overwhelming number of foot-
ball scholarships to counterbalance, participation and scholarship
compliance would pose few problems. For the Division I schools for
which football remains an integral part of their program, however, few
solutions are readily available, or very satisfying.
28. See Naughton, supra note 26, at A39.
29. See Naughton, supra note 26, at A39.
30. See id.
31. See Naughton, supra note 26, at A39.
32. As anyone familiar with this area will quickly discern, my hypothetical is based
roughly on the intercollegiate athletic program I know best-that of the University of Colo-
rado. My remarks should not be interpreted, however, as expressing any opinion about the
University's compliance with Title IX.
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Perhaps the most obvious solution to this quandary is also the one
prohibited by the NCAA. Although only twelve scholarships are
awarded in soccer, for example, the team may have almost twice that
number of players. Allowing the institution to increase the scholarship
dollars to that team (and others, such as track, in a similar situation)
would provide an immediate solution without the expense of adding new
sports.
Adding more women's teams is another alternative, but a costly one.
New sports, of course, cost far more than the scholarship allocations per-
mitted. Coaches must be hired, practice and competition facilities may
be needed, additional trainers and other support personnel must be ad-
ded, equipment and uniforms must be purchased, and travel for competi-
tion must be provided. In the hypothetical suggested, for example, the
addition of new women's teams would also increase the participation
rate and, ironically, result in women participating at a rate in excess of
their representation in the student body. (Would this permit the men to
sue under Title IX claiming under-representation?)
According to a survey by The Chronicle of Higher Education, only
four Division I-A schools in 1995-96 managed to continue football and
still achieve proportionate participation and scholarship allocation.3
'Two of these institutions34 had a female student body well below the
national average. The other two institutions35 supported very large pro-
grams with the total number of athletes significantly in excess of the
NCAA average. (The overall results of the Chronicle's survey found
that women constituted only 37% of all students competing in intercolle-
giate athletics and received 38% of the scholarship dollars.) 36
Others who have worked with the statistics suggest that both propor-
tionate participation and financial aid can be accomplished by carefully
controlling the number of male athletes. Assuming that an institution
has a student body of 50%, one commentator has calculated that it is
possible to have both a 50% participation rate and a 50% financial aid
allocation by fielding the six required men's teams and fielding ten wo-
33. See Naughton, supra note 26, at A39.
34. See id. University of Utah and the Georgia Institute of Technology.
35. See id. The University of Washington's program included 664 athletes; Washington
State University's program had 549. The average size of a Division I program in 1995-96 was
442 students. See id.
36. See Jim Naughton, Survey Shows That Men's and Women's Teams Get Unequal Sup-
port, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 1997, at A39.
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men's teams, while keeping the rosters for the men's team as low as
possible.37
In finding the right combination of sports, men, women, and dollars,
institutions may be pushed towards looking for women's sports that pro-
vide the highest scholarship numbers and discouraging "extra" male par-
ticipants who are willing to play without financial aid incentives.
(Schools with a student population of more than 50% women will find
this an even more difficult equation to satisfy, yet the national average
for four year institutions is 53%).38 Such manipulations seem to be tak-
ing us further and further from our initial goal of providing equitable
athletic opportunities.
II. GENDER EQUITY AND TITLE IX IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The issues of OCR enforcement, proportional participation rates,
and the scholarship dilemma raise at least two sets of broader concerns
that should give us some pause. The first is the role, both past and fu-
ture, of the NCAA. The second is our continuing reliance on mechanical
solutions to complex and thorny problems.
A. The Role of the NCAA
The NCAA's early opposition to Title IX is well-documented, and
the organization undoubtedly must be weary of being blamed in
perpetuity for statements and acts which happened twenty or twenty-five
years ago.39 Nonetheless, even if those early opponents of Title IX have
long since moved on, the NCAA's lack of leadership in this area is
disappointing.4"
The NCAA has by no means ignored the issue of gender equity.
There have been committees, studies, and reports,41 and Title IX issues
are now a meaningful component of the NCAA's certification process
and review. On the other hand, a large number of NCAA members re-
main out of compliance even with the well-established participation
standards adopted by both the OCR and the courts. Yet, the NCAA has
never made a serious effort to use its considerable enforcement powers
37. See Jim Naughton, Focus of Title IX Debate Shifts From Teams to Scholarships,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 29, 1998, at A45.
38. See Naughton, supra note 26, at A39.
39. See George, supra note 3, at 660.
40. See id. at 660-61, 664-66; see also Darryl C. Wilson, Title IX's Collegiate Sports Appli-
cation Raises Serious Questions Regarding the Role of the NCAA, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
1303 (1998).
41. See George, supra note 3, at 660-61.
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to make compliance with federal law a requirement for participating in
sanctioned NCAA competition. Suspending a school's right to compete
is the most serious sanction that can be imposed. It rarely happens and
when it does, all eyes are turned on the institution in question. If the
right to compete were on the line, I suspect that few schools would need
a ten year plan to reach Title IX compliance.
Perhaps more could have been done by the NCAA to work proac-
tively with the OCR to re-examine NCAA rules which impede Title IX
compliance in tandem with the development of workable compliance
standards. In response to the difficulties now presented by the scholar-
ship dilemma, the NCAA Division I Financial Committee is considering
a proposal to decrease the number of football scholarships (from eighty-
five to seventy-five), while increasing the number of scholarships permit-
ted for some women's sports.42 NCAA members might have been better
served if such efforts had been underway long before the National Wo-
men's Law Center brought the issue to a head.
The NCAA's ability to maintain some distance from Title IX is now
under direct review by the United States Supreme Court.43 The litiga-
tion in question involves Renee Smith, a volleyball player who gradu-
ated from St. Bonaventure in only two and a half years. Ms. Smith later
sought to continue her eligibility when she entered postgraduate pro-
grams at Hofstra and then the University of Pittsburgh. The NCAA per-
mits graduate students to participate in intercollegiate athletics, but only
if the student continues to play at the institution where he or she earned
an undergraduate degree. The NCAA denied requests from both Hof-
stra and Pittsburgh for a waiver of this restriction. Ms. Smith sued to
challenge the NCAA's action and, among other things, included an alle-
gation of sex discrimination under Title IX.4
The district court dismissed Ms. Smith's Title IX claim, but the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated that dismissal and remanded to permit
the plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint on the Title IX
claim. "Given the breadth of the language of the Title IX regulation
defining recipient, we hold that allegations in Smith's proposed amended
complaint, that the NCAA receives dues from its member which receive
42. See Naughton, supra note 37, at A45. The proposal includes an increase of ten schol-
arships for women's crew and increases of two scholarships each for women's field hockey,
lacrosse, and track. See id.
43. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
44. See id. at 183-84.
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federal funds, if proven, would subject the NCAA to the requirement of
Title IX."45
Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was recently argued
before the Supreme Court, and the decision is pending.46 Should the
NCAA be subject to direct suit under Title IX, one can imagine other
opportunities for encouraging even more aggressive Title IX compliance
efforts.
B. The Next Wave
The second concern suggested by both the participation and scholar-
ship issues is the re-examination of the mechanical standards that we
have relied upon (willingly or unwillingly) to guide us through the first
two "waves" of Title IX enforcement. The proportionate participation
and allocation criteria as interpreted by the OCR and followed by the
courts have several advantages. The rules are clear and unambiguous.
Any institution (or fourth grader for that matter) can apply these criteria
to determine its own compliance by examining readily available percent-
ages of women in the student body, women as student athletes' gender,
and athletic scholarship dollars awarded to each sex. In essence, the
OCR is mandating a form of quotas.
There is much to be said for these bright line rules, especially when
one goes about changing an entire culture. For most Division I schools
with large sports programs, the mandate in the 1970s to significantly in-
crease the investment in and attention paid to women's sports demanded
a new attitude and a new approach. Given the overwhelming attention
and money associated with football, women's sports were unlikely to
achieve any real parity in the absence of some legal coercion. Recogniz-
ing the enormity of the task at hand, it is unclear whether a more flexible
approach (subject to exemptions and exceptions) could have successfully
achieved gender equality in an environment so dominated by men's
sports.
On the other hand, such bright line approaches are not without costs.
In some cases, we may be encouraging artificial results if a school devel-
ops a new women's team based not on the interests of the current or
45. Id. at 189.
46. See Welch Suggs, Supreme Court Case May Have Major Impact on NCAA Support for
Women's Sports, CHRON. HiGHER EDUC., Jan. 15,1999, at A42; Marcia Coyle, Set To Spike At
The High Court, NAT'L. L. J., Jan. 25, 1999, at A6. [Editors Note: The Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision on February 23, 1999. The court held that the "NCAA is not subject to the
requirements of Title IX on ground it receives dues from its members which receive federal
financial assistance." Smith v. NCAA, 119 S. Ct. 924 (1999).]
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potential women students, but based on the number of participants and/
or scholarships that sport will allow the school to add to the program.
Similarly, one can imagine the school actively recruiting more marginal
female student athletes, while discouraging or turning away similarly sit-
uated men. In general, the mechanical standards may eliminate much of
the program's flexibility to design a program based more on the needs
and the interests of the students. But past experience may leave us skep-
tical that the program would operate with such lofty motives in the ab-
sence of judicial mandates.
For the next wave of Title IX enforcement, part of our challenge
should be to explore more thoughtful approaches and frameworks for
finding solutions to a complex problem. Sports remains one of the few
areas in our society where we continue to sanction gender-segregated
programs. Applying the concept of "non-discrimination" in this context
has not been an easy task, but our use of quotas and mechanical tests in
the early stages should not prevent us from considering more sophisti-
cated analyses in the future.
Two examples may illustrate the problem. On the more trivial side,
women have long understood that the design of restroom facilities in any
large arena requires something more than duplication in order to
achieve equality. If the men's and women's restroom facilities are
designed the same size with the same number of stalls, the men will have
more readily available access than the women. Without belaboring the
details, it is clear that "equality" in that instance requires that the wo-
men's restroom facility be larger.47
On a more serious front, consider the use of mandatory busing as a
tool for desegregating our public school systems. 4 At the time this rem-
edy was imposed on some districts, it may reasonably have been consid-
ered a last resort for an intractable problem based on a much broader
societal and cultural framework. While some may continue to believe
that busing remains the only practical solution in some cases to achieve a
constitutional right, others recognize that the problem is far too complex
to be resolved with one simple solution. Our experience with affirmative
action as a solution to discrimination in other areas creates similar
concerns.
My intent here is not to enter the affirmative action debate or ex-
press a position on the wisdom of busing to achieve desegregation in the
47. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue. A True Story, 6 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L. J. 263 (1990-91) (discussing the concept of "potty parity").
48. See Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Sch. Dist., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970).
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public school system. Rather, my point is to suggest that quotas and
mechanical tests may be an appropriate and even necessary starting
point, but they are rarely a good stopping point in addressing an issue as
difficult as the elimination of discrimination.4 9
As we move into the 21st century, I hope we will continue to struggle
to find a more thoughtful and refined balance between the interests of
our men and women student athletes. Our challenge is to eliminate dis-
crimination in intercollegiate athletics in the context of a society in
which boys and girls continue to get very different messages in the sports
arena. As in other areas of discrimination, an affirmative action re-
sponse may be part of the solution, but concluding that this is the only
and final solution is as good as admitting defeat.
49. Similarly, we may want to consider whether we would in fact wish on our women
student athletes a mirror image of the men's programs. The way in which the men's athletic
programs have been allowed to develop may not be the ideal we would design for student
athletes of either gender.
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